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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Greater Park City Corporation (hereinafter "Park City") is a Utah Corporation with its 
principal business being the Park City Ski Area in Park City, Utah. (R. 45.) In the winter Park 
City operates a gondola and ski lifts. (R. 45.) During the summer Park City operates amusement 
rides, the alpine slide, and miniature golf. (R. 45.) 
Park City filed a sales tax refund with the Utah State Tax Commission (the 
"Commission") for the period June 1991 through June 1994. (Appeal No. 94-1567) Park City 
sought to recover sales tax collected and remitted on the sale of ski lift tickets for that period. 
Petitioner filed a separate request for refund based on sales taxes collected and remitted 
on its summer activities for the period May 1992 through June 1994. (Appeal No. 95-1163) The 
Commission denied Park City's requests and Park City filed for redetermination. (R. 257.) The 
parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on the winter activities. (R. 63.) A formal 
hearing was held regarding the summer activities. (R. 8.) The cases were consolidated by Order 
of the Commission. (R. 222.) The decisions covered both the winter and summer activities in 
one final agency order covering both appeal numbers. (R. 8.) The Commission's final order 
denied Park City's refund requests holding that Park City had no standing to request refunds 
since the tax was paid by the persons purchasing the tickets, not by Park City. (R. 14.) Park City 
filed this appeal. (R. 4.) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii), 78-2-2(4), and 
78-2a-3(2)G). 
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ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Is the Commission's finding that the tax was paid by the persons purchasing the 
tickets supported by substantial evidence? (R. 14.) 
2. Did the Commission correctly conclude that Park City lacked standing to request 
a refund on sales tax collected and remitted. (R. 14.) 
3. Whether admissions to ski lifts and other activities are taxable? (R. 18.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(a)(b), establishes the following standard of review for Tax 
Commission decisions: 
(1) [w]hen reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings commenced before the 
commission, the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall: 
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of fact, 
applying a substantial evidence standard of review; and 
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning conclusions of law, 
applying a correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant of 
discretion contained in the statute at issue before the appellate court. 
The first issue is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(a), the Court is to grant 
deference to the Commission's findings of facts, and uphold them so long as they are supported 
by substantial evidence. Morton Int. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 
1991). 
In cases involving the application of law to the facts, the court may grant some 
"operational discretion" to the agency's application of the law to the facts based on the expertise 
of the agency in that particular area. Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). 
An administrative agency's decision should be given great weight in the agency's area of 
expertise so long as no clear misinterpretation of statutes or rules is evident. Bovd v. Dep't of 
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Employment Sec. 773 P.2d 398,400 (Utah App. 1989). Thus, because the second and third 
questions presented involve an area of special expertise of the Tax Commission, the court should 
apply the deferential standard set forth in Drake when reviewing the Commission's application 
of law to the facts. 
PETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-12-103(l)(f)(i), 59-12-107(2)(e), 59-12-108(3)(a), 59-12-110(1), 
59-12-120(2) and Utah Admin. Code § R865-19-34S are set forth in full in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Park City is a resort that sells tickets for numerous recreational activities. (R. 10, 
44,317-324.) 
2. Park City has collected and remitted sales tax on charges for admission to these 
activities since opening the facilities, including during the period from June 1991 through June 
1994 ("refund period"). (R. 10,330-338.) 
3. During the summer months, Park City operates several recreational facilities at the 
Park City Ski Area. These include an alpine slide (on which riders ascend a hill on a ski lift and 
descend in a track on a ride resembling a small bobsled or luge), a gondola (which is used to 
transport skiers and sightseers up the mountain), a miniature golf course (known as Silver Putt 
Park), and a group of children's amusement rides such as a carousel, train, and airplanes (known 
as Little Miner's Park rides). (R. at 10,45,46.) 
4. During the winter months, Park City sells ski lift tickets to customers that use the 
Park City ski lifts and gondola. Skiers are not permitted to use the ski lifts or gondola without a 
lift ticket, but may go upon the premises and use the ski runs if they do not ride upon the lift or 
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gondola. (R. at 9,10.) 
5. Park City has also claimed $263,541 as its share of the investment incentive to ski 
resorts provided by Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-120, which based the investment incentive upon the 
proportional amount of "sales tax collected from the sale of ski lift tickets." (R. 11,118.) 
6. During the refund period, Park City submitted sales and use tax returns to the 
Commission. (R. 284, 285, 332.) 
7. Park City has regularly filed sales tax returns and remitted the amount of tax 
shown due thereon. On those sales tax returns, Park City has claimed and retained 1.5% of the 
amount of tax remitted as the vendor discount as permitted by Utah Code Annotated § 59-12-
108(3). That statute permits vendors, who meet certain requirements, to "retain an amount not to 
exceed 1.5% of the total monthly sales tax collected " (R. 10,11,284, 285, 355.) 
8. The sales tax was included in the purchase price on each ticket purchased from 
Park City. (R. 10,286, 330-335, 356.) 
9. The Commission found that Park City did not pay the tax, and that the tax was 
"paid by the persons purchasing the tickets". (R. 14.) 
11. When Park City filed its sales tax returns, it calculated the net amount of sales by 
dividing its gross receipts by 1.0725, which was to discount the gross amount by 6.25% for the 
sales and use tax, and one (1.00%) percent for the resort area tax. Park City then calculated the 
sales tax due on the net amount, after deduction of the 6.25% for sales tax and the one (1.00%) 
percent for resort area tax. (R. 11, 286, 329-336.) 
12. If Park City's theory were to be accepted that it was the payor of the sales tax, 
then it would have been required to pay sales and use tax on the gross amount of the sales prior 
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to the reduction, and it would have been required to pay more sales and use tax than it has paid. 
(R. 18,356.) 
13. The Commission did not make a legal determination whether the sales tax would 
have been legally required to be collected and paid as tax on an admission pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 59-12-103(l)(f). (R. 18.) 
14. The issue of whether the charges of Park City are "admissions" is moot because 
the refund cannot be paid to Park City regardless of whether or not the charges were for an 
admission, because Park City collected that money from its customers and therefore lacks 
standing to request the refunds. (R. 19.) 
SUMMARY QF THE ARGUMENT 
Park City does not have standing to request a refund because it did not pay the tax but 
instead collected it from its customers. Petitioner can not challenge this factual finding on appeal 
since it has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the Commission's factual findings. The 
Commission's findings are supported by the following "substantial evidence": Park City's 
method of calculation of the tax based on the net amount of sales, the fact that Park City claimed 
a 1.5% vendor discount, Park City received $263,541 as an investment incentive allowed to ski 
resorts based on the total tax collected. These facts confirm the findings of the Commission that 
Park City did not pay the tax but merely collected and remitted it to the Commission. Park City 
has made affirmative representations that it has collected the tax. The Commission has relied on 
these representations to its detriment, therefore Park City should be estopped from asserting that 
it paid rather than collected the sales tax. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(2)(e), even if the tax were collected in error, Park 
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City has no claim to the money. Since Park City collected and remitted the sales tax from its 
customers and would have no claim to any funds even if they were collected in error, Park City 
has suffered no injury and has no personal stake in the outcome. Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-
12-110(1) refunds may only be made to "the person paying the tax", Park City therefore lacks 
standing to request a refund. 
The first issue is dispositive of Park City's claim, therefore the Court, like the Tax 
Commission, need not address any other issue. However, should the court deem it necessary to 
address the merits of Park City's claim it should hold that admissions to ski lifts and Park City's 
summer activities were taxable. Admissions to a "mechanical or self-operated device" were a 
taxable admission to a place of amusement or recreation under Rule R865-19-34S(A). Thus 
under the code in effect at the time of the transactions, Park City's activities were taxable. 
Moreover, the Utah legislature clarified application of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 in 1994 and 
specifically and unambiguously stated that admissions to ski lifts and runs are taxable. When a 
statute is merely clarified, it may be given retroactive effect. Under the 1994 amendment to Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-103 there is no question that Park City's activities would constitute taxable 
admissions. 
The cases cited by Park City in support of its argument are distinguishable. Cases from 
other jurisdictions are not applicable due to the different statutory schemes and legislative 
history. This court must follow the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Barrett Inv. Co. v. State 
Tax Comm'n. 387 P.2d 998,1000 (Utah 1964) which clearly states that ski lift tickets are taxable 
admissions. This court should not attempt to apply 49th Street Galleria v. State Tax Comm'n. 
860 P.2d 996 (Utah App. 1993) retroactively to facts that case did not specifically address. 
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Finally, even applying the reasoning ofGalleria. Park City's activities would constitute taxable 
admissions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PARK CITY FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE THAT 
SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S DECISION. 
In order to have standing to claim a refund Park City has to show it paid the taxes to the 
Commission, otherwise it has no "distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake 
in the outcome of the dispute." Naf 1 Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. Of State Lands. 869 
P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1993). Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(2)(e) requires vendors who collect 
excess tax to remit it to the Commission. The vendor may not retain any tax collected in error. 
Refunds of overpayments can only be made to the person who paid the tax. Utah Code Ann. § 
59-12-110(1). See. United States v. Richardson. 418 U.S. 166, 172 (19974) holding that a 
person must have paid the tax to have suffered an injury sufficient to grant standing. 
Park City suffered no injury and has no personal stake in the outcome of this dispute 
because it merely collected tax from its customers. This is a specific finding of fact by the Tax 
Commission. (R. 18.) In fact, the Commission has found several facts that support the same 
conclusion. Park City merely filed the tax returns and remitted tax collected from its customers. 
(R. 14.) It found that it "just charged a gross price and then netted the amount of sale from the 
tax for reporting purposes." (R. 14.) Commission specifically found that though Park City did 
not show the amount of tax on the tickets, but charged the gross price, "[petitioner was not the 
taxpayer who paid the tax." (R. 14.) It found that "the tax was paid by the persons purchasing 
the tickets." (R. 14.) Moreover, Park City was reporting that it was collecting sales and use tax 
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from its customers. (R. 18.) It was taking the vendor discount (R, 10.), and received money under 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-120 based on sales tax collected on lift tickets. Also, the Commission 
has found that: 
if Park City's theory were to be accepted that it was the payor of the sales 
tax, then it would have been required to pay sales and use tax on the gross amount 
of the sales prior to the reduction, and it would have been required to pay more 
sales and use tax than has been paid. 
Because Park City failed to marshal the evidence that it has paid the tax, its claim should 
be dismissed. The Utah courts require that in order to challenge trial court's factual findings, a 
person must "marshal [sic] the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the . . . court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of the evidence." In the Interest of D.G. v. State of Utah. 938 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah App. 
1997); Citing State ex rel. E.D. v. E.J.D.. 876 P.2d 397, 402 (Utah App. 1994). In 
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse. 872 P.2d 1051,1053 (Utah App. 1994), the 
Utah Court of Appeals held: 
successful challenges to findings of fact must demonstrate to appellate courts first 
how the trial court found the facts from the evidence and second why such 
findings contradict the weight of the evidence. 
In that case, the petitioner failed to "ferret out a fatal flaw" and demonstrate why that evidence is 
clearly erroneous. isL 
The Court of Appeals also noted that: 
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting 
evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity 
of that flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's 
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finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
See also West Vallev City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 131L 1316 (Utah App. 1991). 
Park City has failed to meet this burden. In fact no attempt has been made to show the 
facts which support the Commission's findings. Park City's brief lacks a statement of facts. 
Park City attempted to avoid making a transcript of the proceedings part of the record. (R. 1.) 
The transcript and evidence submitted clearly support the Commission's finding that Park City 
collected the tax from its customers. 
The Commission found that Park City merely collected tax from its customers and did 
not pay the tax itself. So long as this factual finding stands Park City is not entitled to a refund, 
can show no injury, and has no personal stake in the proceedings. Therefore this court should 
find that the Commission properly dismissed Park City's claim as lacking standing. 
II. THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE, 
Factual findings will only be reversed if the findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence. Drake v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah. 939 P.2d 177,181 (Utah 1997) (stating that 
"[w]here the issue is purely factual, appellate review is highly deferential, requiring reversal only 
if findings are clearly erroneous.") When the evidence is marshalled as required it 
overwhelmingly supports the Commission's decision. 
A. Method of calculation of the tax bv Park Citv shows that Park Citv merely 
remitted th? collected tax. 
Park City's method of calculation of the sales tax due on its sales and use returns makes it 
clear that Park City merely collected sales tax from its customers. Park City calculated the tax by 
taking the gross amount of receipts and dividing it by 1.0725 for the purpose of reducing the 
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gross amount received by an amount equal to the sales and resort area tax. (R. 15,286, 329, 335.) 
Park City also reported to the state of Utah "that sales were made in a net amount, and that sales 
and use taxes of 6.25% and 1.00% of the net amount of sales were collected." (R. 15, 335.) This 
is clearly reflected in the testimony of Park City's employee, Mr. Fish. During cross-
examination, Mr. Fish confirmed that Park City calculated sales tax based on the net amount of 
sales. (R. 333-34.) 
Q (By Mr. Snelson) I guess if-you said, "we don't collect sales tax from our 
customers," and you're remitting sales tax based on ticket sales for the slide, golf, 
miners park and the gondola. And if that tax isn't collected from the customers 
and you charge your customers $6.00, why, then, would there be an adjustment to 
that price before you figured how much tax was due to the State? 
A As far as I know, that was just the way that we have to calculate the amount of tax 
that we owe that time. 
Q That's just the instructions that you received from your boss and people that were 
telling you how to do it? 
A Correct. 
Q Okay . . . Let's use a hypothetical amount, $10,000 gross ticket sales. 
A Okay, $ 10,000. We would then divide that by 1.0725 to give us our debt number 
we use for sales tax purposes . . . 
THE WITNESS: Okay. What we would do is we would call that our net sales and 
then this number we then multiply by 6.25 percent-,0625. 
Q (By Mr. Snelson) And that is-
A Our state-
Q —state sales tax? 
A State sales tax. 
(R. 334-35.) 
Thus, the method that Park City used to calculate the sales tax does not indicate that Park 
City was paying the sales and use tax but that it was merely remitting the collected tax to the 
Commission. If the Park City did not include the sales tax in price, but instead absorbed the tax 
and paid it itself, it would have been required to calculate its sales tax liability based on its total 
gross sales revenue. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1). Instead, Park City calculated its tax based 
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on the net amount of sales and that "sales and use taxes of 6.25% and 1.00% of the net amount of 
sales were collected." (R. 15.) Therefore, this methodology establishes beyond doubt that Park 
City did in fact collect the tax from its customers as found by the Commission. 
B. Park City claimed a vendor discount that indicates that it did not pav the tax. 
Second, Park City applied for and received a 1.5% vendor discount allowed by Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-108(3)(a) on the sales tax returns it filed. (R. 16,284.) Section 59-12-
108(3)(a) states: "a vendor who is required to remit taxes monthly under this section may retain 
an amount not to exceed 1.5% of the total monthly sales tax collected " This allowance is to 
offset the costs of collecting and remitting the tax. IJL Because Park City availed itself of this 
discount, it affirmatively represented that it did not pay the tax but merely collected and remitted 
the tax to the Commission. 
The fact that Park City claimed a vendor discount is confirmed by returns on file with the 
Commission. (R. 284,285.) Moreover, during the direct examination of Larry Wursten, an 
accountant for the Commission, the following information was revealed: 
Q So, this is a calculation that returns to the vendor 1.5 percent? 
A Of the state. 
Q Of the state portion and-
A One percent of the local and transit. 
Q One percent of the local tax collected to the vendor for the expenses of 
collecting and remitting taxes? 
A That's correct. 
Q So if you're not collecting and remitting taxes, would you be entitled to 
this credit? 
A No. 
(R. 355.) The evidence solidly supports the Commission's findings that Petitioner did not pay 
the tax. Therefore the Commission's conclusion that Park City lacks standing is mandated by 
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-110. 
C. Park Citv received the investment incentive allowed to ski resorts, which was 
calculated based upon the total tax collected from sales of ski lift tickets bv Park 
Citv. 
Because Park City requested the investment incentive allowed to ski resorts which was 
calculated based upon the total sales tax collected from the sales of ski lift tickets in Utah, 
Park City again affirmatively represented that it did not pay the sales tax itself. Utah Code Ann. 
§59-12-120(2) provides: 
the investment incentive paid out of the account shall be allocated among ski resorts 
based the relation between the total sales tax collected from the sale of ski lift tickets 
in Utah to the total sales tax collected from the sale of ski lift tickets in Utah by each 
ski resort. 
(Emphasis added.) Moreover, during the House discussion of the Senate Bill #34 that introduced 
the incentive, Representative Lemm noted that he was sure that everybody understood that this 
"[was] proposed to be a credit against the sales tax on the lift tickets." Incentives to Ski Resorts, 
Hearings on S.B. 34 Before the House, 48th General Session (February 22, 1989) (Statement by 
Representative Lemm). (See Addendum B) Moreover, Park City's president, Phil Johnson, and 
attorney Gordon Strachan, lobbied for Senate Bill #34 that introduced this incentive in 1989. 
(Addendum C) Park City requested an incentive refund in the amount of $263,541 on August 
17,1990. (R. 16,118,120.) 
The inconsistency between the actions of Park City and the representations it relies on to 
support its claim are stark when the facts are examined. These facts support the Commission's 
findings. Park City's actions speak volumes. Every action of Park City contradicts its naked 
assertion that it paid the tax out of its own funds rather than funds charged to and collected from 
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its customers. Since the money was not paid by Park City it has no right to the money nor 
standing to seek a refund. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-12-107(2)(e) and 59-12-110(2). 
III. PARK CITY SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THAT IT 
PAID THE SALES TAX ITSELF. 
Utah courts have held that in order to prevail on an estoppel claim, three elements must 
be met. First, "a statement, admission, act or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim 
later asserted." O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd.. 929 P.2d 1112,1116 (Utah App. 1996). 
The second element is a "reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of 
the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act." 14. Third, there should be "injury to 
the second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
statements, admission, act or failure to act." IdL See also State Dep't of Human Serv. v. Irizarrv. 
893 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah App. 1995). 
In the present case, all three elements of estoppel have been met. First, Park City filed 
tax returns and claimed that it collected tax from its customers. It has also applied for and 
received the vendor's discount on those returns. Park City applied for and received $263,541 
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-120, based on sales tax collected. These representations are 
inconsistent with present claims made by Park City. 
Second, the Commission relied on Park City's representations. It allowed the vendor 
discount. It paid out $263,541 under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-120 and the state budgeted and 
spent funds remitted by Park City. The Commission has acted to its detriment, and will suffer 
injury if Park City were allowed to now contradict its prior representations. Since all elements of 
estoppel have been met, Park City should not be allowed to contradict all prior representations 
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and actions and claim that it absorbed the tax and paid it itself. 
Park City has failed to marshal the evidence that would allow it to attack the 
Commission's factual findings. Those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Park City 
should be estopped from attempting to contradict its prior representations. Therefore this Court 
should find that Park City did not pay the taxes and therefore lacks standing to request a refund. 
IV. ADMISSIONS TO SKI LIFTS AND PARK CITY'S SUMMER 
ACTIVITIES ARE TAXABLE ADMISSIONS. 
A. Ski lift ticket? are taxable mfar the Utah statutes. 
The Utah Legislature has explicitly stated that charges for ski lift tickets are taxable. Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-120. Prior to amending Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 in 1994,1 sales tax was 
levied on any person who purchased "admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or 
recreation." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(f). The Tax Commission by rule has recognized 
that "the sale of a ticket for a ride upon a mechanical or self-operated device is an admission to a 
place of amusement." Utah Admin. R. R865-19-34S(B) 
Park City sells tickets and receives payment for admission to and for riding upon its 
gondola, ski lifts, alpine slide, and children's amusement rides, all of which are "mechanical 
devices." (R. 46, 314.) Park City has conceded that a ski area is a "place of recreation". (R. 
362.) In order to get to the top of the alpine slide, customers must ride upon a ski lift, another 
"mechanical device". (R. 46.) Additionally, the alpine slide qualifies as a "self-operated device" 
because the rider controls and maneuvers his own sled on the way down the track. (R. 45.) 
1
 In 1994, the Utah Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(l)(f). The amended 
statues states that admissions to ski lifts, ski runs and ski trails are taxable. 
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Therefore, tickets sold by Park City for the gondola, alpine slide, and amusement rides are 
taxable as "admissions" under the version of § 59-12-103(l)(f) in effect at the time the tickets 
were sold. Park City charged, collected and remitted tax on these transactions. (R. 18.) 
The Utah Legislature has specifically recognized that ski lift charges are subject to sales 
taxes. In 1989, after lobbying by the ski industry, and prior to the refund period at issue, the 
Utah Legislature passed Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-120 (Utah Laws, 1989 Ch. 239 § 1). This 
provision granted ski resorts a capital investment incentive "allocated among ski resorts based on 
the relation between the total sales tax collected from the sale of ski lift tickets in Utah to the 
total sales tax collected from the sale of ski lift tickets in Utah by each ski resort." Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-120(2)(1989). The legislature made the provision applicable "to any person 
operating a ski resort in the state of Utah." IsL Thus, the legislature has specifically and 
unambiguously recognized that ski lift ticket sales are taxable. 
The doctrine of in pari materia requires that statutory provisions dealing with the same 
subject be read in harmony. See Murray Citv v. HalL 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983); Utah 
County v. Orem Citv. 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985); Sutherland Statutory Construction § 
51.02, at 290 (4th ed. 1973). Therefore, the Court must read § 59-12-103, which imposes a tax 
on admissions, in harmony with § 59-12-120, which provides an investment incentive based on 
the tax imposed. This interpretation is consistent with the clearly manifested legislative intent 
that sales of ski lift tickets are taxable as admissions. 
In Barrett Inv. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 387 P.2d 998,1000 (Utah 1964), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that out of state purchases of machinery and equipment used to assemble ski 
lifts were not exempt from use tax despite the fact the ski resort collected and paid a sales tax on 
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admission for the use of ski lifts. The plaintiff in Barrett was a ski resort operator that challenged 
a deficiency of the use tax assessment. IsL at 998-999. In characterizing the plaintiffs business, 
the court made specific statements regarding the tax status of ski lift admission charges. The 
court stated that "[p]laintiff s business is the selling of rides on the ski lift for which it charges 
fees for admissions. The sales tax is collected and paid on these admission charges." 14. at 999. 
Just like the plaintiff in Barrett. Park City is a ski resort operator, in the business of 
"selling of rides on the ski lift for which it charges fees for admissions" and "[t]he sales tax is 
collected and paid on these admission charges." (R. 10.) 
Though areas of the resort are open for use without charge, using a ski lift or an alpine 
slide, or a gondola requires purchase of a ticket. (R. 313-14.) Moreover, customers cannot go 
into fenced areas without a ticket. (R. 314-15.) For example, during cross-examination of Phil 
Jones, President of Greater Park City Co., Mr. Jones admitted that "you must have a ticket to be 
on the rides." (R. 320.) Park City's argument that they do not charge "admission" because you 
can enter areas of the resort without cost ignores the fact that they &) charge admission to ride on 
the lifts and other mechanical devices. Thus, Park City charges an admission fee to places of 
amusement, entertainment, and recreation as set forth in R865-19-34S. Since admissions to 
Park City's resort were taxable under the code in effect at the time of the transactions, Park City 
would not be entitled to a refund even if it had standing to request one. 
Park City cites Citv of Sun Vallev v. Sinclair Oil Co.. 851 P.2d 961, 963 (Idaho 1993), to 
argue that ski lift tickets were not taxable admission charges in Utah. This case should be 
distinguished. First, the Idaho court is interpreting its own statute with its own unique legislative 
history and intent. The Idaho legislature did not adopt any provision similar to § 59-12-120 
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which specifically states that ski lift tickets are subject to sales tax. Second, the Idaho court 
construed another section of the same statute and held that lift tickets ai£ taxable as receipts from 
use or privilege of using facilities "for recreational purposes." Id. at 963. Thus, the issues facing 
the Idaho court were significantly different from those presented here. 
B. 49th Street Galleria does not conflict with the Commission's Decision. 
This Court's decision in 49th Street Galleria should be distinguished on its "facts." First, 
not a single witness was called at the hearing before the Tax Commission in the Galleria case. 
All of the Commission's and this court's factual "findings" were based solely on the hearsay 
statements offered by counsel in arguing the case. Second, the activities at issue in Galleria are 
not at issue here. Finally, there is specific guidance from both the Legislature and the Utah 
Supreme Court on whether ski lift tickets are taxable. The Court in Galleria did not have that 
benefit. 
Moreover, in 49th Street Galleria. the Court of Appeals focused on an admission as "the 
right to enter a place." 14. at 1000. The 49th Street Galleria court was not faced with activities 
which had been specifically designated as taxable admissions under Rule R865-19-34S. Rule 
R865-19-34S specifically states that "the sale of a ticket for a ride upon a mechanical or self-
operated device is an admission to a place of amusement." Utah Admin. R. R865-19-34S(B). 
This issue was not directly before the court in 49th Street Galleria. 
Park City also argues that rides on the gondola and alpine slide, amusement rides, and 
miniature golf are not admissions because no fee is charged for the right to enter the property. 
However, no one can enter the alpine slide or play miniature golf without paying the entry fee. 
(R. 320.) Riders are not permitted to ride their own skateboards, roller blades, or other devices 
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down the alpine slide free of charge; nor are non-riders allowed to enter the track. (R. 319.) 
Likewise, the Little Miners Park rides are in a fenced enclosure, and no one is allowed to use the 
mechanical devices without a ticket. (R. 314, 315, 322.) Riders are not permitted to enter the 
gondola or ski lifts without purchasing a ticket. (R. 318.) The testimony of Mr. Jones made 
clear that without a ticket you could not ride the lifts, gondolas, or summer amusement rides. (R. 
319, 320, 322.) The fact that the resort area in general may be open does not mean that there are 
no admission charges to these particular places of amusement, entertainment, or recreation 
located within Park City's resort. 
The Commission has stated that "[t]he phrase 'place of amusement, entertainment, or 
recreation' is broad in meaning " Utah Admin. R. R865-19-34S(A). An "admission" charge 
is not limited to a charge to enter the resort area, but also includes charges for amusement rides 
and other activities located within the area. Thus, the charges made to ride the various devices 
are admissions under Rule R865-19-34S(B). It is of no consequence that one may enter the 
grounds free of charge. The admissions to ride the slide, gondola, and other attractions are each 
in and of themselves admissions to places of amusement or recreation, and are therefore taxable 
under the former and current version of § 59-12-103(l)(f). 
Therefore, even if this court applies the reasoning of 49th Street Galleria to this case, the 
result is the same. The activities Park City charge for constitute taxable admissions. Any 
decision to the contrary would be in direct conflict2 with Barrett, a prior Supreme Court case that 
2
 See gentry Investigation, fop, y, Pavjg, 841 P.2d 732, 734 (Utah App. 1992) 
recognizing that the Court of Appeals "simply cannot overrule the law as announced by the 
highest court in the state." 
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states that admissions to ski lifts are taxable. Barrett, at 999. 
C. The 1994 amendment to 59-12-103 was merely a clarification and mav be applied 
in this case. 
The 1994 amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 that specifically lists ski lifts, runs 
and trails as taxable admissions was intended as clarification. Utah courts have held that when 
the statute was enacted "to clarify or amplify how the earlier law should have been understood" 
rather than to amend it, it could be applied retroactively. Kofoed v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 872 
P.2d 484,485 (Utah App. 1994). The court held in Kofoed that an amendment excluding 
inmates from statutory definition of employee was a clarification and could be applied 
retroactively. 
In the present case, the 1994 amendments to the section 59-12-103 were enacted to 
clarify the existing liabilities for "admissions" under 59-12-103. The legislative history of the 
statute provides clear evidence that the section was enacted to clarify existing law rather than to 
extend the tax to all of the named activities. For example, before the 1994 amendments were 
adopted, title of Senate Bill 191 sponsored by Senator Barlow stated the following: 
AN ACT RELATING TO REVENUE AND TAXATION; 
CLARIFYING THE TREATMENT OF ADMISSIONS AND USER FEES FOR 
SALES TAX PURPOSES; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE . . . . 
S. J., 50th General Legislative Session (February 4,1994). (Emphasis added.) (See Addendum 
D) Under established principles of statutory construction, the title of the statute may be 
examined to remove ambiguities. Sutherland Stat. Constr. § 47.03 (5th Ed.). See also Young v. 
Barnev, 20 Utah 2d 108,433 P.2d 846, 847 (1967). Moreover, during the Floor Debates in the 
Senate in 1994, it was mentioned in reference to Senate Bill 191 that "this is simply an 
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adjustment, it's not, some will probably regard it as a new tax." (See Addendum E) It was also 
mentioned that "the title of the bill is clarifying the treatment of admission" which is reflective of 
its true nature. IdL Thus, the 1994 amendments clarified taxation of ski lifts and runs and did not 
change the law governing those activities. Therefore, these amendments could be applied 
retroactively.3 Thus, because the 1994 amendments were adopted simply for clarification of 
existing statutory law, and admissions to ski lifts, runs and trails were taxable prior to the 
adoption of the 1994 amendments, these amendments could be applied retroactively eliminating 
any possible doubt regarding the taxability of activities conducted by Park City, and precluding 
any possible claim for refund of taxes collected and remitted on these activities by Park City. 
CONCLUSION 
Park City failed to marshal the evidence supporting the Commission's factual findings, 
therefore it can not challenge the underlying factual basis of the Commission's decision. The 
evidence supporting the fact that Park City collected the tax from its customers is overwhelming. 
For example, Park City calculated the sales tax base on the net amount of sales after removing an 
amount equal to the tax actually collected. Also, Park City claimed and received the vendor 
discount available only to those who "collect and remit the tax." Park City also received 
$263,541 under § 59-12-120 based on the sales tax collected from the sale of ski lift tickets. Park 
City should be estopped from asserting that it did not pay the tax based on its prior acts and 
3
 See also Okland Constr. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n. 520 P.2d 208, 210 (Utah 1974) (holding 
that principle that statute should not be applied retroactively does not apply "where the later 
statute or amendment deals only with clarification or amplification as to how the law should have 
been understood prior to its enactment"); Washington Nat'1 Ins. v. Sherwood Assocs.. 795 P.2d 
665, 669 (Utah App. 1990) (deciding that when the statutory amendment "simply clarifies the 
legislature's previous intentions . . . it is procedural.) 
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affirmative representations. 
Because Park City collected tax from its customers, it is QQ! entitled to a refund since 
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(2)(e), even assuming the tax was collected in error, it can not 
be retained by the vendor. Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-110 only those who pay the tax 
may receive a refund when an overpayment occurs. Therefore this Court should hold that Park 
City lacks standing to request a refund. 
Should this Court reach the second issue presented it should find that admissions to Park 
City's ski lifts and its summer activities were properly taxable as admissions. Admissions to ski 
resorts were taxable under the old version of the statute. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
ski lift tickets constitute taxable admissions. The Legislature has also spoken clearly on this 
subject, first in § 59-12-120 and in clarifying the application of § 59-12-103 in the 1994 
amendment. Both are clear statements of legislative intent that ski lift tickets are taxable 
admissions. Therefore, the Tax Commission respectfully requests that the appeal of Park City be 
denied and the Order of the Commission affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 3J? day of August, 1997. 
L^ Iark L. Snelson 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
1953 
VOLUME 6B 
1992 REPLACEMENT 
Title 59 
THE MICHIE COMPANY 
Law Publishers 
Charlottesville, Virginia 
59-12-103. Sales and use tax base — Rate-
CD There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for 
the following: 
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state* 
(b) amount paid to common carriers or to telephone or telegraph corpo-
rations, whether the corporations are municipally or privately owned, for: 
(i) all transportation; 
(ii) intrastate telephone service; or 
(iii) telegraph service; 
(c) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished 
for commercial consumption; 
(d) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished 
for residential use; 
(e) meals sold; 
(f) admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation, 
including seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar ac-
commodations; 
(g) services for repairs or renovations of tangible personal property or 
services to install tangible personal property in connection with other 
tangible personal property; 
(h) cleaning or washing of tangible personal property; 
(i) tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer court accommodations and ser-
vices for less than 30 consecutive days; 
(j) laundry and dry cleaning services; 
(k) leases and rentals of tangible personal property if the property situs 
is in this state, if the lessee took possession in this state, or if the property 
is stored, used, or otherwise consumed in this state; and 
(1) tangible personal property stored, used, or consumed in this state. 
(2) Except for Subsection (l)(d), the rates of the tax levied under Subsection 
(1) shall be: 
(a) 53/32% through December 31, 1989; and 
(b) 5% from and after January 1, 1990. 
(3) The rates of the tax levied under Subsection (l)(d) shall be: 
(a) 23/32% through December 31, 1989; and 
(b) 2% from and after January 1, 1990. 
(4) (a) From January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1999, there shall be 
deposited in an Olympics special revenue fund or funds as determined by 
the Division of Finance under Section 51-5-4, for the use of the Utah 
Sports Authority created under Title 9, Chapter 1, Part 3, Utah Sports 
Authority Act: 
(i) the amount of sales and use tax generated by a l/s4% tax rate on 
the taxable items and services under Subsection (1); 
(ii) the amount of revenue generated by a V64% tax rate under 
Section 59-12-204 on the taxable items and services under Subsection 
(1); and 
(iii) interest earned on the amounts under Subsections (i) and (ii). 
(b) These funds shall be used by the Utah Sports Authority as follows: 
(l) to the extent funds are available, to transfer directly to a debt 
service fund or to otherwise reimburse to the state of Utah any 
amount expended on debt service or any other cost of any bonds 
issued by the state to construct any public sports facility as defined in 
Section 9-1-303; and 
(ii) to pay for the actual and necessary operating, administrative, 
legal, and other expenses of the Utah Sports Authority, but not in-
cluding protocol expenses for seeking and obtaining the right to host 
the Winter Olympic Games. 
59-12-107. Collection, remittance, and payment of tax by 
vendors and consumers — Returns — Direct pay-
ment by purchaser or dealer of vehicle — Other 
liability for collection — Credits — Deposit and 
sale of security — Penalties. 
(1) (a) Each vendor shall pay or collect and remit the sales and use taxes 
imposed by this chapter if within this state the vendor: 
(i) has or utilizes an office, distribution house, sales house, ware-
house, service enterprise, or other place of business; 
(ii) maintains a stock of goods; 
(iii) engages in regular or systematic solicitation of sale of tangible 
personal property, whether or not accepted in this state, by the distri-
bution of catalogs, periodicals, advertising flyers, or other advertising 
by means of print, radio, or television, or by mail, telegraphy, tele-
phone, computer data base, optic, microwave, or other communica-
tion system for the purpose of selling, at retail, tangible personal 
property; 
(iv) regularly engages in the delivery of property in this state 
other than by common carrier or United States mail; or 
(v) regularly engages in any activity in connection with the leas-
ing or servicing of property located within this state, 
(b) If none of the conditions listed under Subsection (a) exist, the ven-
dor is not responsible for the collection of the use tax but each person 
storing, using, or consuming tangible personal property is responsible for 
remitting the use tax. 
(2) (a) Each vendor shall collect the sales or use tax from the purchaser. 
(b) A vendor may not collect as tax an amount, without regard to frac-
tional parts of one cent, in excess of the tax computed at the rates pre-
scribed by this chapter. 
(c) (i) Each vendor shall: 
(A) give the purchaser a receipt for the use tax collected; or 
(B) bill the use tax as a separate item and declare the name of 
this state and the vendor's use tax license number on the invoice 
for the sale. 
(ii) The receipt or invoice is prima facie evidence that the vendor 
has collected the use tax and relieves the purchaser of the liability for 
reporting the use tax to the state as a consumer. 
(d) A vendor need not maintain a separate account for the tax collected, 
but is deemed to be a person charged with receipt, safekeeping, and trans-
fer of public moneys. 
(e) If any vendor, during any reporting period, collects as a tax an 
amount in excess of the lawful state and local percentage of total taxable 
sales allowed under this part and Part 2, the vendor shall remit to the 
commission the full amount of the tax imposed under this part and Part 2 
plus any excess. 
(f) If the accounting methods regularly employed by the vendor in the 
transaction of the vendor's business are such that reports of sales made 
during a calendar month or quarterly period will impose unnecessary 
hardships, the commission may accept reports at intervals that will, in its 
opinion, better suit the convenience of the taxpayer or vendor and will not 
jeopardize collection of the tax. 
59-12-107 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
(3) Each person storing, using, or consuming tangible personal property 
under Subsection 59-12-103(1) is liable for the use tax imposed under this 
chapter. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (5) and in Section 59-12-108, the 
sales or use tax imposed by this chapter is due and payable to the commis-
sion quarterly on or before the last day of the month next succeeding each 
calendar quarterly period. 
(b) Each vendor shall, on or before the last day of the month next 
succeeding each calendar quarterly period, file with the commission a 
return for the preceding quarterly period. The vendor shall remit with the 
return the amount of the tax required under this chapter to be collected or 
paid for the period covered by the return. 
(c) Each return shall contain information and be in a form the commis-
sion prescribes by rule. 
(d) The sales tax as computed in the return shall be based upon the 
total nonexempt sales made during the period, including both cash and 
charge sales. 
(e) The use tax as computed in the return shall be based upon the total 
amount of sales or purchases for storage, use, or other consumption in this 
state made during the period, including both by cash and by charge. 
(f) The commission may by rule extend the time for making returns 
and paying the taxes. No extension may be for more than 90 days. 
(g) The commission may require returns and payment of the tax to be 
made for other than quarterly periods if it deems it necessary in order to 
ensure the payment of the tax imposed by this chapter. 
(5) (a) On each vehicle sale made by other than a regular licensed vehicle 
dealer, the purchaser shall pay the sales or use tax directly to the com-
mission if the vehicle is subject to titling or registration under the laws of 
this state. The commission shall collect the tax when the vehicle is titled 
or registered. 
(b) Upon application for title or registration of each vehicle sold by a 
regular licensed vehicle dealer, the dealer shall certify to the commission 
whether or not the dealer is current in the payment and reporting of sales 
or use tax, as required by Subsection (4). Each vehicle dealer not in 
compliance with Subsection (4) shall remit the sales or use tax to the 
commission upon application for title or registration of the vehicle. Any 
violation of this subsection, or the falsification of any required informa-
tion, is a class A misdemeanor. 
(6) If any sale of tangible personal property or any other taxable item or 
service under Subsection 59-12-103(1) is made by a wholesaler to a retailer, 
the wholesaler is not responsible for the collection or payment of the tax 
imposed on the sale if the retailer represents that the personal property is 
purchased by the retailer for resale and the personal property thereafter is not 
resold. Instead, the retailer is solely liable for the tax. 
(7) If any sale of property or service subject to the tax is made to a person 
prepaying sales or use tax in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 51, Resource 
Development, or to a contractor or subcontractor of that person, the person to 
whom such payment or consideration is payable is not responsible for the 
collection or payment of the sales or use tax if the person prepaying the sales 
or use tax represents that the amount prepaid as sales or use tax has not been 
fully credited against sales or use tax due and payable under the rules pro-
mulgated by the commission. Instead, the person prepaying the sales or use 
tax is solely liable for the tax. 
SALES AND USE TAX ACT 59-12-107 
(8) Credit is allowed for prepaid taxes and for taxes paid on that portion of 
an account determined to be worthless and actually charged off for income tax 
purposes or on the portion of the purchase price remaining unpaid at the time 
of a repossession made under the terms of a conditional sales contract. 
(9) (a) The commission may require any person subject to the tax imposed 
under this chapter to deposit with it security as the commission deter-
mines, if the commission deems it necessary to ensure compliance with 
this chapter. 
(b) The commission may sell the security at public sale if it becomes 
necessary to do so in order to recover any tax, interest, or penalty due. 
(c) The commission shall serve notice of the sale upon the person who 
deposited the securities either personally or by mail. If notice is by mail, 
notice sent to the last known address as it appears in the records of the 
commission is sufficient for the purposes of this requirement. 
(d) The commission shall return to the person who deposited the secu-
rity any amount of the sale proceeds that exceed the amounts due under 
this chapter. 
(10) (a) It is unlawful for a vendor, with intent to evade any tax, to fail to 
timely remit the full amount of tax required by this chapter. A violation 
of this section is punishable as provided in Section 59-1-401. 
(b) Each person who fails to pay any tax to the state or any amount of 
tax required to be paid to the state, except amounts determined to be due 
by the commission under Sections 59-12-110 and 59-12-111, within the 
time required by this chapter, or who fails to file any return as required 
by this chapter, shall pay, in addition to the tax, penalties and interest as 
provided in Section 59-12-110. 
(c) For purposes of prosecution under this section, each quarterly tax 
period in which a vendor, with intent to evade any tax, collects a tax and 
fails to timely remit the full amount of the tax required to be remitted, 
constitutes a separate -(Tense. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, § 5; 1933 (2nd 
S S ), ch. 20, § 1; 1937, ch. I l l , § 1; 1937, ch. 
112 § 1; 1939, ch. 103, § 1; C. 1943, 80-15-5; 
L 1947, ch. 118, § 1; 1949, ch. 83, § 1; 1953, 
ch 113, § 1; 1975, ch. 181, § 1; 1981, ch. 240, 
§ 1-1983, ch. 266, § 4; 1984, ch. 64, § 1; 1985, 
ch. I l l , § 2; 1986, ch. 55, § 4; C. 1953, 
59-15-5; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 3, § 21; 
1987, ch. 5, § 24; 1988, ch. 66, § 3; 1990, ch. 
215, § 2; 1991, ch. 241, § 86. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1988, deleted "motor" 
before "vehicle" in two places and inserted 
"titling or" before "registration" in two places 
in Subsection (7); substituted "Subsections (7) 
and (9)" for "Subsection (7)" in the first sen-
tence of Subsection (8); added present Subsec-
tion (9); and redesignated former Subsections 
(9) to (18) as present Subsections (10) to (19). 
The 1990 amendment, effective July 1, 1990, 
rewrote this section to such an extent that a 
detailed description is impracticable. 
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
1991, substituted "class A" for "class B" in the 
final sentence in Subsection (5)(b) and made a 
correction in the name of the chapter reference 
in Subsection (7). 
Legislative Intent. — Laws 1990, ch. 215, 
§ 3 provides: "The Legislature intends to make 
the changes in the definition and status of re-
tailers and vendors under this act prospective 
only. It also intends that these changes may 
not be construed to require retailers, as defined 
in Subsection 59-12-102(9)(c), and vendors, as 
defined in Subsection 59-12-102(17)(b), to pay 
or collect and remit any sales or use tax that 
may have been otherwise due and payable be-
fore July 1, 1990." 
Cross-References. — Entity created for in-
terlocal cooperation subject to state sales and 
use tax, § 11-13-26. 
Motor vehicle registration, § 41-1-18 et seq. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
59-12-108. Monthly payment — Penalty. 
(1) Any person whose tax liability under this part and Part 2, was $50,000 
or more for the previous year, shall on or before the last day of the month next 
succeeding each calendar month, file with the commission a return for the 
preceding monthly period. The vendor shall remit with the return the amount 
of the state and local tax required under Parts 1, 2, and 5 of this chapter to be 
collected or paid for the period covered by the return. The commission shall 
establish by rule the procedures and guidelines in determining the tax liabil-
ity under this section. 
(2) Any person whose tax liability under this part, Part 2, and Part 5 was 
$96,000 or more for the previous year, shall transmit the monthly amount of 
state and local tax payment due under this section to the tax commission by 
electronic funds transfer. 
(3) (a) A vendor who is required to remit taxes monthly under this section 
may retain an amount not to exceed 1.5% of the total monthly sales tax 
collected under Part 1 of this chapter, and 1% of the total monthly sales 
tax collected under Parts 2 and 5 of this chapter for the cost to it of 
collecting and remitting sales and use taxes to the commission on a 
monthly basis. 
(b) The commission shall, on a one-time basis, retain the first $125,000 
in local sales tax proceeds collected under Parts 1, 2, and 5 of this chapter 
to pay the costs incurred by the commission in implementing the reim-
bursement rates under this subsection. 
(4) Penalties for late payment shall be as provided in Section 59-1-401. 
History: C. 1953, 59-15-5.1, enacted by L. 
1984, ch. 64, § 2; 1986, ch. 55, § 5; renum-
bered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 25; 1988, ch. 213, 
§ 10; 1992, ch. 298, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, rewrote the sec-
ond sentence of Subsection (3) which read "In 
addition to any other penalties for late pay-
ment there shall be a penalty of 10% of the 
total amount of the prepayment due." 
The 1992 amendment, effective July 1,1992, 
rewrote this section. 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1988, 
ch. 213, § 17 provides: "This act has retrospec-
tive operation to taxable years beginning on or 
after January 1, 1988." 
Cross-References. — Resource develop-
ment, prepayment of taxes, § 63-51-7. 
SALES AND USE TAX ACT 59-12-110 
59-12-110. Overpayments and deficiencies. 
(1) As soon as practicable after the return is filed, the commission shall 
examine it. If it then appears that the correct amount of tax to be remitted is 
greater or less than that shown on the return to be due, the tax shall be 
recomputed. If the amount paid exceeds that which is due, the excess, together 
with interest thereon at the rate prescribed in Section 59-1-402 from the date 
of overpayment, shall be credited or refunded to the person paying it, upon 
written application, if it is determined that the overpayment was not made for 
the purpose of investment. 
(2) If any tax, penalty, or interest has been paid more than once or has been 
erroneously collected or computed, the commission shall credit it on any 
amounts then due from that person to the state under this chapter or under 
any other taxing law, the administration of which is vested in the commission, 
and the balance shall be refunded to that person or his successors, administra-
tors, executors, or assigns. No such credit or refund is allowed unless a claim 
is filed with the commission within three years from date of overpayment. 
(3) If any amount has been erroneously determined to be due from any 
person, the commission shall authorize the cancellation of the amounts upon 
its records. 
(4) If the amount paid is less than the amount due, interest at the rate 
prescribed in Section 59-1-402 shall be added to the difference due computed 
from the time the return was due. 
(5) If any part of the deficiency is due to negligence or intentional disregard 
of authorized rules with knowledge thereof, but without intent to defraud, 
there shall be added a penalty as provided in Section 59-1-401 and interest at 
the rate prescribed in Section 59-1-402 to the amount of the deficiency from 
the time the return was due. 
(6) If any part of the deficiency is due to fraud with the intent to evade, 
there shall be added a penalty as provided in Section 59-1-401 and interest at 
the rate prescribed in Section 59-1-402 to the amount of the deficiency from 
the time the return was due. 
(7) The deficiencies in tax, together with penalties and interest imposed by 
this section, shall be due and payable by the taxpayer within ten days after 
notice and demand by the commission, except that when the commission de-
termines that a greater amount was due than was shown on the return, and 
the tax is not deemed to be in jeopardy, the additional tax, penalty, and 
interest shall be due and payable within 30 days after the commission mailed 
its report of deficiency determination. 
(8) Except if a deficiency is due to fraud with intent to evade tax or of a 
failure to file a return, the amount of taxes imposed by this chapter shall be 
assessed within three years after the return was filed and if not so assessed no 
proceeding for the collection of the taxes shall be begun after the expiration of 
the period. 
(9) In the case of a false or fraudulent return or payment with intent to 
evade tax or of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed or a proceeding 
for the collection of the tax may commence without assessment at any time. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, § 8; 1939, ch. 103, 1983, ch. 275, § 1; C. 1953, 59-15-8; renum-
§ 1; C. 1943, 80-15-8; L. 1967, ch. 163, § 1; bered by L. 1987, ch. 3, § 22; 1987, ch. 5, 
1969 (1st S.S.), ch. 14, § 4; 1977, ch. 219, f 28. 
§ 19; 1980, ch. 69, § 25; 1983, ch. 266, § 5; 
SALES AND USE TAX ACT 59-12-120 
59-12-120. Investment incentive to ski resorts for lease or 
purchase of certain equipment — Ski Resort Cap-
ital Investment Restricted Account created — 
Conditions and restrictions on receiving incen-
tive — State Tax Commission to administer. 
(1) Any person operating a ski resort in the state of Utah shall be entitled 
to an investment incentive in an amount not to exceed the costs incurred in 
the purchase or lease of: 
(a) snow making equipment; 
(b) ski slope grooming equipment; and 
(c) passenger tramways as defined in Subsection 63-11-38(5). 
(2) The investment incentive allowed in Subsection (1) shall be paid from 
the Ski Resort Capital Investment Restricted Account created in Subsection 
(5). The investment incentive shall be allowed only to the extent that for each 
dollar of investment incentive allowed, three dollars shall be expended for the 
purchase or lease of property described in Subsection (1) by a person operating 
a ski resort. The investment incentive paid out of the account shall be allo-
cated among ski resorts based on the relation between the total sales tax 
collected from the sale of ski lift tickets in Utah to the total sales tax collected 
from the sale of ski lift tickets in Utah by each ski resort. 
(3) The investment incentive is available to any person operating a ski 
resort in the state of Utah making purchases or leases of property described in 
Subsection (1) on or after January 1, 1989 and on or before December 31, 
1992. All claims made under this section against the amount in the Ski Resort 
Capital Investment Restricted Account shall be made on or before June 30, 
1993. 
(4) If a ski resort is sold or leased to an unrelated third party within four 
years after the reporting period in which the investment incentive allowed in 
Subsection (1) is taken, the person who received the investment incentive 
shall reimburse to the Ski Resort Capital Investment Restricted Account an 
amount equal to all investment incentives received during the period de-
scribed in Subsection (3). For purposes of this subsection, if a ski resort is sold 
in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding, the sale shall be considered the 
kind of sale requiring the reimbursement of the investment incentive. 
(5) There is created the Ski Resort Capital Investment Incentive Restricted 
Account within the General Fund. The amount appropriated in this section is 
nonlapsing until July 1, 1993. 
(6) The State Tax Commission shall administer this section by rule. 
History: C. 1953, 59-12-120, enacted by L. Cross-References "General Fund" de-
1989, ch. 239, § 1. fined, § 67-4-2. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 239 be-
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
R865-19S-34. Admission to Places of Amusement Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
59-12-103. 
A. The phrase "place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation" is broad in meaning but 
conveys the basic idea of a definite location. 
B. The amount paid for admission to such a place is subject to the tax, even though such 
charge includes the right of the purchaser to participate in some activity within the place. For 
example, the sale of a ticket for a ride upon a mechanical or self-operated device is an admission 
to a place of amusement. 
C. Charges for admissions to swimming pools, skating rinks, and other places of amusement 
are subject to tax. Charges for towel rentals, swimming suit rentals, skate rentals, etc., are also 
subject to tax. Locker rental fees are subject to sales tax if the lockers are tangible personal 
property. 
Addendum B 
Senate Bill 34 in the House 
? Representative Lemm 
Lemm: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Every session there is a bill like a cat with nine lives, 
third substitute Senate Bill 34 the bill that really doesn't need any greater 
introduction to this body, I believe you've heard the issue discussed and debated 
during the course of this session. As I begin, I want to explain to everyone, and 
my position being appropriations co-chair that this bill doesn't not have any 
money in it. I would not be standing before you if there was any further 
appropriation in this FY89 or FY90, it's been amended out in the Senate, there's 
no fiscal note attached with this bill for those two years. I believe there's just a 
few points I want to reaffirm in your minds, because like I say I'm sure you 
understand that this is a proposed to be a credit against the sales tax on the lift 
tickets. Utah's Ski industry, ski resorts are at somewhat of a competitive 
disadvantage due to Utah's tax structure. I'd be the first to admit that their not the 
only industry that can make that case. I recognize that going in. But I believe that 
given the circumstances they're in right now, in terms of their relationship to our 
sister states, who are really our competition for our out-of-state tourists, which we 
have worked so hard and continue to work hard in terms of our economic 
development, in terms of our tourism, that some kind of a mechanism is 
appropriate, I believe to help them accommodate a restructuring of some of their 
capital needs. Now they're not here asking for something in terms of an operation 
to enhance their position there, but there's a real need with the technologic, it's 
getting late, the changes they need to make in their capital structure, that need to 
be retooled. There's a lot of innovative things that are out there that cost a lot of 
dollars that's being done by our competition, this is not an on going commitment, 
it's something that 1 believe does make sense and it can be justified. I think the 
passage of this bill certainly sets forth a positive signal to further our enhancement 
for our Olympics, certainly we can't advocate those if we don't have a structure in 
place to entice the skiers and the tourists from throughout the world that Utah is 
prepared and will be prepared to deal with them and I think that probably the fact 
that there's no money in the bill this year may not be all that bad with the vote 
that's coming up this fall in terms of our Olympics. I think that if that's a positive 
vote, then I think it would enhance the attitude and feeling of this legislative body 
that something ought to be done to concur with that vote of the people. Obviously 
they're not tied together, I think that they had not intentions to tie them together, 
but I believe it would be an argument could be made that there would be 
justification for putting funding in at that point. It's a three to one match, it's for 
equipment, and it has a sunset provision in it. With that Mr. Speaker I will defer 
to others that wish to speak and try to answer any bills that I might. Any 
questions. 
Speaker: That will be interesting. Representative Demetrich 
Demetrich: Yeah, thank you Mr. Speaker, fellow legislators. I rise in support of this bill. 
We've in this legislative body been talking about economic development for Utah 
every since I've been here. First of all we ought to start at home and send a 
positive image to the industries that we now have in Utah, it's unfortunate that we 
are unable to fund this industry at this time, the mechanism is in place, we are 
sending a positive image not only the ski industry but to the skiers throughout the 
country that Utah is going to welcome these people to our resorts. We are giving 
some flexibility where the ski industry can invest more money in Utah. And I 
strongly urge the support of this bill. Thank you. 
Speaker: Thank you Representative. Representative Moody. 
Moody: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I too rise in support of this bill, I recognize there is no 
funding in it, but it sets up a mechanism down the road that the legislature has 
money there and wants to be able to encourage that end, to better development our 
ski industry, to be able to prepare for the Olympics and other and other events in 
terms of being able to create a winner atmosphere to recruit and make people, 
frankly an exciting place to come. I will share with you just one moment, I 
received a phone call from a ski owner, who said they tried, they just put in four 
quad chairs that are detachable, so they're about three to four times faster in 
Idaho, and they've indicated that if this bill were to really take off in Utah, they 
would expect to see that or more in the industry here in Utah as well. So I think it 
does certainly there is no money in it now, but it provides us if we do have 
surpluses areas that we want to encourage it we have the vehicle to deal with it 
and I support the bill. 
Speaker: 
Olson: 
Speaker: 
Sponsor: 
Speaker: 
Sponsor: 
Speaker: 
Olson: 
Sponsor: 
Representative Olson 
Will the sponsor yield 
Will the sponsor yield? 
Any body but you. 
Will the sponsor yield? 
Yes. 
Proceed. 
When do we pay for thi 
It will be determined b> 
not there is ever any money, legislative session whether or not there's ever any 
money put in the account to accommodate this a credit. 
Olson: Why don't we wait until then to make that determination, then? 
Sponsor: Well, I guess you could argue that you should do that, I believe that the issue has 
been before us, I think that the ski industry is entitled to a public expression of 
support for this thing even though at this point in the process we're not arguing to 
take it away from anybody who has it now. I think it's a good positive signal to 
send, it's an important industry in our State and obviously it will be back at a later 
date to, seeking funding if the circumstances dictate. 
Olson: Is it binding then? We pass the bill and then it's binding that it will be built into 
the budget next year. 
Sponsor: No, there is nothing that binds any appropriations. 
Olson: But if the bill is on the books, it will be funded next year as part of the regular 
appropriation. 
Sponsor: No it won't. It would be on the books subject to further legislative action either in 
the way of an appropriation, in an appropriations bill, or a bill that would 
authorize transfer of an appropriation into this account. But it would not be built 
into the budget. 
Speaker: Representative Wilson 
Wilson: Thank you Mr. Speaker, will the sponsor yield 
Speaker: Will the sponsor yield 
Sponsor: Yes 
Wilson: In looking at the amendment which eliminates on page 3 part of line 6 and all of 
line 7, can you explain why we did not just delete all of subsection 5 and 
subsection 6. 
Sponsor: I really can't answer that Representative Wilson. It doesn't apply, it's a harmless 
thing to leave in the bill, I can't answer that, it wasn't taken out in the Senate, 
there's no money so it really doesn't apply so I don't you know. 
Wilson: What we have done is to create a restricted account within the general fund, can 
that account exist without any dollars in it or would there be a minimal amount 
put in? 
Sponsor: It would exist without any money at all, unless we appropriate some, there would 
be zero in there. 
Wilson: And then we continue on and explain that it is non-lapsing. And then we give the 
Tax Commission the rule, the administrative rule power to do it, fellow legislators 
I can appreciate the importance of the ski industry, I think the commitment to 
economic development and the importance of this type of an industry stands on 
other grounds by this legislature. We've had an abundance of money we've 
funded new things and old things from one end of the state to the other, this 
particular matter has appeared on numerous appropriation lists of prioritization to 
designate the money, it starts out at a higher amount, it comes down and it has 
failed in each instance, and now with some of the support it's shown it would 
appear that the thing is fairly well greased. But it appears to me to be a poor 
choice of public policy regardless of the importance of the ski industry and the 
importance of the buzz word economic development and we all jump and talk 
about people coming here, it strikes me as poor public policy that will expand. I 
don't think the end justifies the means. We don't have the money, we'll be in as 
good a position next year to decide if we need this, it will be the same group, we 
can control it then, we can set up the fund, we can set up the details of it, let's 
defeat this. Thank you. 
Speaker: Representative Young to the bill. 
Young: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I rise to make an amendment to this bill. On page 3, line * 
8,1 propose we delete all the language on line 8. 
Speaker: The motion is on page 3 line 8 of the third substitute, that we delete the language 
on line 8. Representative you may present the amendment. 
Young: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Fellow legislators, no one is more interested in the ski 
industry than I am and I think we have a commitment to support that industry. 
But I believe we rise false hope when we put language in a bill like this, we 
restrict, we establish a restricted fund and then play games with it. I would 
suggest that we take language out of the bill so there is no misunderstanding and 
if at some future time we determine that we appropriate to the bill, we can re-
establish the restricted account. 
Speaker: To the amendment. Representative Brown to the amendment. 
Brown: I don't have any problem, if that's the will of the body to take that out. 
Speaker: Are there others who want to speak to the amendment. Representative Ellertson 
Ellertson: Thank you Mr. Speaker, substitute motion 
Speaker: 
Ellertson: 
Speaker: 
Ellertson: 
Speaker: 
Ellertson: 
Speaker: 
Brown: 
Speaker: 
Brown: 
Speaker: 
Brown: 
Speaker: 
Oscarson: 
Speaker: 
Substitute motion is in order. 
Substitute motion is, we delete lines 5 through 9. 
Substitute motion is that we delete the remaining language in lines 5 through 8 or 
9? 
Okay, you may present it. 
This seems to me that sitting here the last few days, it seems like there has been 
an awfully lot of bills come rolling through here where we're giving agencies the 
authority to make law by rule. So I would hope that we would eliminate that 
possibility from the Tax Commission as far as this ?\ece of legislation is 
concerned. As far as the previous amendment is cc.wcmed, the sunset date was 
really probably the one thing we needed in it, but if we're going to eliminate it 
let's take out all of that language. 
Representative Brown to the motion 
1 would resist this motion. I think, you know, if you want to do that, I guess you 
vote against the bill. You just fear yourself, you know you're just saying you fear 
yourself, by placing this amendment. There's no money that goes into this 
account, what does it hurt to have it. The reality is that without this, you would 
not be able to make a direct appropriation in an appropriations act in the future. 
And it just, you know, compounds the problem. I would resist that we do it and 
request the division of the motion. 
The division you request is what part Representative. 
Well I would divide the first part of the, the first sentence there is created a ski 
resort capital incentive restricted account within the general fund as separate vote. 
From the rest of the language which would be line 8 and line 9. 
Yes 
4kay. To the substitute amendment now. Those who want to speak to the 
substitute amendment. Representative Oscarson to the substitute. 
Yes. 
Proceed 
Oscarson: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I agree with Representative Brown, I think, they need 
the incentive in there. And what I've been told, well the money part would be let 
go, but there needs to be created the incentive for this and so I would move with 
Representative Brown on that, leave that first part in there, I think it's needed. 
Thank you. 
Speaker: Other's to the amendment to the substitute amendment. Representative James. 
James: Thank you Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak in opposition to the substitute amendment. 
Basically what this substitute would do was literally neuter the bill. And testify to 
the world that Utah needs to invest some dollars in the State of Utah and this is a 
good way to do it for short period of time document to be used in three different 
methods. Each of those methods are to improve the ski conditions of Utah to 
make them competitive of our neighboring states with better snow making 
equipment, ski slope grooming, and ski lift transportation, every one of those is a 
good asset to the State of Utah. I encourage you to reject to substitute motion. 
Thank you. 
Speaker: To the substitute motion to delete the language. Representative EUertson you may 
sum up. 
EUertson: Well, I'll be very brief. If we don't have any money in the fund, why do we have 
the fund, let's come back when we get the money and put the fund back in. 
To the motion to amend. It is a substitute amendment, it has been divided. I will 
first take line five and the part of line 6 that still remains which ends with the 
general fund and the period. All in favor of that motion, which is to delete the 
language say Aye. Opposed no. Motion fails. The second part of the motion will 
delete the language on lines 8 and 9 all those in favor of that motion say aye, 
opposed no. Motion fails. We're back to the original motion. Representative 
Young, you want to sum up on your original motion. 
I'll waive summation. 
The motion is that we delete the language on line 8, all in favor of the motion say 
aye, opposed no. Motion fails. We're back to the bill. Representative Harlem. 
I move for the previous question on the bill. 
Previous question on the bill, previous question has been called on the bill, all in 
favor of the previous question on the bill say aye, opposed no. Motion carries. 
Representative Brown. 
Thank you Mr. Speaker, I know the times late, there are many bills to be 
considered. I won't spend any more time, the issue's clear, I would urge your 
Speaker: 
Young: 
Speaker: 
Harlem: 
Speaker: 
Brown: 
adoption. 
Speaker: Voting is open on third substitute Senate Bill 34. Representative Valentine. 
Valentine: Mr. Speaker I would like to declare a conflict on this bill. 
Speaker: Conflict is declared by Representative Valentine. 
? I'll declare a conflict of interest as well. 
? Did you get mine. 
? Mr. Speaker, division please. 
Speaker: Division. 
? These guys have beat me up so bad on this I don't know what I want, all I want is 
38 votes. 
? You got 'em, you want anything else? 
? I think that's it. 
Speaker: The big guns have won out. It appears from the chair that all present have voted. 
Voting is closed on third substitute Senate Bill 34. Third substitute Senate Bill 34 
having received 41 affirmative and 32 negative, passes this House, third substitute 
Senate Bill 34 has been signed by the Speaker and the signing will be noted in the 
journal. Representative Fuller. 
Fuller: I just wanted to declare a conflict of interest. 
Speaker: Representative Fuller declares a conflict of interest on the bill. Representative 
Harrington 
Harrington: Personal privilege for just a second. 
Speaker: Granted 
Harrington: Fellow Representatives, Pd like to report to you, first of all I appreciate the 
support you gave on Senate Bill 3 the Drug precursor bill, I just had a report that 
the fourth drug raid is made in the last ten days. 
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Addendum C 
MINUTES OF THE 
REVENUE AND TAXATION STANDING COMMITTEE 
January 27, 1989 -- 9:00 A.M. ~ ROOM 305 STATE CAPITOL 
Staff Present: 
Others Present; 
Members Present: Sen. Lorin N. Pace 
Sen. William T. Barton 
Sen. Lyle Hillyard 
Sen. C. E. Peterson 
Sen. Omar B. Bunnell 
Sen. Frances Farley 
Sen. Cary G. Peterson 
Mark Andrews, Research Analyst, 
Suzanne V. Reese, Secretary 
Gordon Strachan, Park City Ski Area 
Jan Leanard, CTEC, Inc. 
Phil Jones, Park City Ski Area 
Mike Beeley, LMC, Inc. 
(List of others present on file) 
Chairman Pace called the meeting to order at 9:00 a.m. 
1. S.B. No. 34, SALES TAX - SKI RESORT CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
INCENTIVE. 
MOTION: Sen. Hillyard moved to amend the bill by replacing 
it with a substitute bill to be known as Substitute S.B. 
No. 34. The motion passed unanimously with Sen. Barton and 
Sen. Cary Peterson absent at the time of voting. 
Sen. Hillyard introduced and spoke favorably of the bill. 
Jan Leonard, CTEC Ski Lifts; Mike Beeley, Logan Manufacturing 
Company; and Phil Jones, Pres. of Park City Ski Area; spoke 
favorably of the bill. 
Joe Duke-Rosati, S.L.C.A.P.; and Norm Sims, President of 
the United Association of Community Councils in Salt Lake County; 
spoke against the bill. 
Jack Olsen, Utah Tax Payers Assoc, suggested a direct 
State appropriation to the ski industry, and stated the Association 
would support the bill with that approach. 
Sen. Bunnell made a presentation and spoke against the 
bill. (See file for information prepared by Sen. Bunnell.) 
The committee asked questions of Sen. Hillyard and 
discussed the bill further. 
Minutes of the Revenue and Taxation Standing Committee 
January 27, 1989 
Page 2 
MOTION: Sen. Chuck Peterson moved to pass the bill out of 
committee with a favorable recommendation. The motion 
passed with Sen. Bunnell, Sen. Farley, and Sen. Pace voting 
in opposition. 
MOTION: Sen. Chuck Peterson moved the committee accept the 
minutes from January 25, 1989. The motion passed 
unanimously. 
The meeting was adjourned at 10:00 a.m. 
Minutes were reported by Suzanne Reese 
Sen. Lorin N. Pace 
Chairman 
Addendum D 
Day 19 SENATE JOURNAL 367 
STATE BOARD OF REGENTS ON BEHALF OF SALT LAKE COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE FROM S5,000,000 TO $5,150,000 FOR THE COLLEGE'S 
SCIENCE/MAJOR INDUSTRY BUILDING; AND PROVIDING THE STATE 
BOARD OF REGENTS WITH AUTHORITY TO ISSUE REVENUE BONDS 
ON BEHALF OF SNOW COLLEGE FOR S2,000,000, PLUS ANY 
ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS NECESSARY TO PAY COSTS INCIDENT TO THE 
ISSUANCE AND SALE OF THE BONDS, FOR AN 
ADMINISTRATION-STUDENT CENTER AT THE COLLEGE, was read the 
first time and referred to Rules Committee. 
TASK FORCE ON SPECIAL DISTRICTS 
S.B. 190 Brent C. Richards 
AN ACT RELATING TO THE LEGISLATURE; CREATING A SPECIAL 
DISTRICTS REVIEW COMMITTEE TO STUDY SPECIAL DISTRICTS; 
DEFINING ITS MEMBERSHIP, OPERATION, AND DUTIES; 
APPROPRIATING $36,000 TO PAY THE COSTS OF THE TASK FORCE; AND 
ADDING A REPEALER, was read the first time and referred to Rules Committee. 
SALES TAX - TREATMENT OF ADMISSION AND USER FEES 
S3.191 Haven J. Barlow, Lyle W. Hillyard, Lane Beanie 
AN ACT RELATING TO REVENUE AND TAXATION; CLARIFYING 
THE TREATMENT OF ADMISSIONS AND USER FEES FOR SALES TAX 
PURPOSES; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE, was read the first time 
•nd referred to Rules Committee. 
MOONWALKER SAFETY ACT REPEAL 
*•*• 192 Craig A. Peterson 
AN ACT RELATING TO CITIES AND TOWNS, COUNTIES, AND 
JUBUC SAFETY; REPEALING MOONWALKER LICENSING AND SAFETY 
REQUIREMENTS, was read the first time and referred to Rules Committee. 
LOBBYIST RESTRICTIONS 
* * •
1 9 3
 Scott N. Howell 
^ A N ACT RELATING TO THE LEGISLATURE; PROHIBITING STATE 
^ C l A L S FROM BECOMING LOBBYISTS FOR TWO YEARS AFTER 
^^ AVING OFFICE, was read the first time and referred to Rules Committee. 
Addendum E 
Senate Bill 191 
Clerk: Senate Bill 191 - Sales Tax Treatment of Admission and &User Fees by Senator 
Haven Barlow and the Committee Report February 15, 1994. Mr. President the 
Revenue and Tax Committee reports a favorable recommendation on Senate Bill 
191 with amendment on page 8 line 16 respectfully Lyle Hillyard, Committee 
Chair. 
President: Senator Hillyard, Senator Craig Peterson, those in favor say Aye, Opposed No, 
motion carries. Senator Barlow 
Barlow: Mr. President, on 1911 would like to make one amendment. In the committee we 
failed to make the, failed to take in another area, so on line 18 page 8 where it has 
"games" I would like to move that we put brackets around the word games in as 
much as we took care of that in the other bill that we passed onto third reading 
calendar, so I so move. 
Clerk: Where is that again? 
President: Motion to amend? 
Barlow: Yes. 
President: Discussion? Those in favor say aye. Opposed No., Motion carries. Further 
discussion on the bill now. 
? Members of the Senate you should have on your desk two sheets passed out by 
me, the current tax policies on admissions, amusements, and recreation, do you 
have those copies? If you do not, I'll see that you get a copy on vour desk. On 
the first one, the first sheet, summary on Senate Bill 191, let me read this, under 
the current tax code it is uncertain as to which entertainment items are required to 
have sales tax. The Tax Commission in uncertain, they have the S rule to 
determine the taxes. The S rule is that if an event starts with an S it is taxed, if it 
does not start with an S the chances are it is not taxed. Now I know that is a little 
facetious, but what we are doing here is we are taking care of the uncertain^. If 
you look at the title of the bill, the title of the bill is clarifying the treatment of 
admissions whereas the other bill which as you know I wanted to take out that 
was a new tax and even in the title of the bill it mentioned that it was a new tax. 
Let me just point this out, as we go through here, this in on the next sheet, 
admissions to movies, starts with an S so its shows, it brings in around $2,534,000 
now ski lifts for instance that starts with an S so it brings in $1,631,000, 
admissions to amusement parks are specific areas where entertainment is 
presented, that brings in $5,228,000, admissions to swimming pools, now that is 
taxed in some cases, now its taxed if you, if you require everybody entering the 
swimming pool to be charged a fee, but if you let some people enter the 
swimming pool and they don't have to charge the fee for instance like coaches or 
friends or so forth, therefore that would not be taxed. And that's an inconsistency 
that needs to be corrected. And also admissions to skating rinks, batting cages 
and so forth, that has not been taxed, it was a very cloudy area and now just 
recently they have, they are considering taxing that. Now this bill would 
definitely make sure that is compliance with the others that are being taxed. So 
what we're doing is skating rinks we're including, miniature or regular golf 
course we're including, the reason why these two have been excluded before is 
because a non-player can enter a golf course and not play and therefore they say 
that doesn't have to be taxed. Same way with the skating rinks. Bowling alley, 
anybody can enter a bowling alley, therefore they have ruled that bowling alleys 
don't have to be taxed. We'll clarify that with this bill. Tennis and racket court 
fees that will now be taxed, and so forth. Now this is simply an adjustment, it's 
not, some will probably regard it as a new tax, but not in the manner in which that 
we passed the previous bill. So, I know we spend enough time on these 
exemptions, but this will go a long ways to take care of the the 5.7 million that we 
are committed, and I think we are committed, to do away with sales tax 
exemptions. This will provide us with about half of that amount of money. So, 
are there any questions that anyone would like to ask. 
President: Senator Myrin? 
Myrin: Thank you Mr. President. I would like to make a motion for an amendment. On 
page 10 line 15, after the words ski lifts, put beginning July 1, 2003. 
President: On page 10? 
Myrin: Yeah. 
President: Discussion of that amendment. 
Myrin: The thing that's happened here is we've jumped this ahead a year. It would have 
had hearings next year on these issues. I'm told we're the only state other than 
New Hampshire is it, that taxes these, and so you know we're out there as the only 
state doing it, I think that would have come up in a hearing next year dialogue 
it at that time, but since we aren't going to do that, I'd like to make this motion at 
this time and then we'd not be the only of two states in the nation taxing this 
entity. 
President: Discussion, further, Senator Hillyard? 
Hillyard: I stand to support the motion made by Senator Myrin. As some of you know 
about the importance of the ski industry to the state of Utah and as Senator Myrin 
indicated, we and New Hampshire, as I recall are the only two states that impose a 
sales tax on lift tickets. Not that it makes a difference to us locally as much as 
what our ski industry is able to do as they compete with out-of-state skiers when 
you go to a place like Colorado and see the tremendous amount of money they put 
into attracting the non-residents to come to the state, the money they have that's 
available to them to expand their facilities and then you look at Utah. And right 
off the top from every ski pass, be it $30 or $35, sales tax is removed from that 
into a net amount that they get. I think that if there is one thing and again the 
motion that Senator Myrin made would basically exempt it from sales tax for the 
next ten years which leads into the times of the Olympics and gives them the 
chance to make the types of capital improvements that they need to do in the ski 
industry, it will be for each ski capacity, so Park City or Beaver, or one of those 
other ski resorts end up using that it will be money. I think we have as a 
legislature to come back periodically and review what they're doing for capital 
facilities and enhancing and attracting the nonresidents to come here and spend 
money in out state. I think if we don't get the Olympics we can come back and 
change that effective date, but again this is imposed strictly on the question of 
admissions and it's a tax, as I understand it is imposed by the State Tax 
Commission and looking the matter over we as a legislature haven't imposed the 
tax specifically and directly, and I think Senator Myrin's motion would have a 
significant impact to what is our key industry of bring nonresidents and spending 
a tremendous amount of money in this state and I think giving each ski resort the 
facility to use some of that sales tax money would be highly significant. And I 
add with it the fact that most people don't know that when you pay $30 or $35 for 
a ski lift pass that you are in fact paying a sales tax. It's not something they 
charge you $35 plus, it's built in. So by removing it you're going to have the 
impact of people know that but you're really going to help the ski industry in that 
area. It has a 1.6 million dollar fiscal note, but the other fiscal note puts it well in 
the positive and the additional, so then it was a net benefit, so I think that's 
partially what Senator Barlow is trying to get. 
President: Senator McCallister 
McCallister: If I understand your amendment, Senator Myrin, you would amend on line 17 
page 10? 
Myrin: My computer says page 10, but on the hard copy it is page 8. I would make the 
motion on page 8, line whatever, 15 after ski lifts. Sorry about that. 
Clerk: What is the language? 
Myrin: The language was after ski lifts, insert beginning July 1, 2003. 
McCallister: I'd understood you were amending line 10 which would have effected every 
single item in here. 
Myrin: I don't know why the computer says at the bottom here it's page 10, but that's 
something we've got to learn I guess. 
McCallister: Well, I'm wondering if on line 17 page 10 it says this act takes effect July 1, 1994 
and you're saying except ski lifts except that will be 10 years later. 
Myrin: Yes. 
McCallister: But ski runs and ski trails would be subject to tax. 
? ....bill 
? Skating rinks 
? I'd really like, it's my preference to do them all. And I'm told the fiscal impact of 
that would be about one third, what's the total bill? 
? 1.6 
? Well the total would be 4.9 so that's in effect taking about one third of the 4.9 
? No, we have already taken out about 700,000 so we're looking at about 4 million 
about 4 million, the bill has now before you bring about 3, 200,000, now that's, so 
if we were to take out 1,600,000 you're looking at about a half 
President: Senator Blackham 
Blackham: I have just a little concern with the proposal, you know, I think we're going to set 
up a situation where if we build it they will come. If we get the olmpics they're 
going to come. I don't think the sales tax is the issue at all. If they're going to be 
here for the olmpics, they're going to be here as many people as we can 
accommodate will be here. And if you have we have to wait until after the 
olmpics, I don't think that's applicable at all. I mean, if we want to wait one year 
and maybe have some debate about the ski industry and whether we put the tax on 
or not, I think there might be some reason for that, but to delay it clear 'til after 
the olmpics I think we're taking a select group of people of outsiders who are 
probably more than happy to pay the 6% tax and I can't see why we're forgoing 
that. This whole grouping of people have not had very much public comment on 
this and so to take the ski industry and pull them out, I don't feel very comfortable 
about doing that. I don't think that in most brochures they send out the rates and 
things, they general put plus tax. And generally on ski passes or whatever they 
don't generally list all the taxes, they just put plus taxes. Unless you ask, if you 
call up for a hotel room or whatever, most of the time they'll tell you the base rate 
plus taxes. And I don't know if I buy this argument that people don't come 
because they're worried about a 6% sales tax. I might, but I know one thing, I'm 
not comfortable with delaying it for that length of time, because I think the 
olmpics, they'll definitely come if that's the case I don't know why we would 
want to delay until after the olmpics maybe delay one year I could accept, and I 
guess I'm just about to the point where I'd like to make a substitute motion and 
that would be the substitute motion I'd delay it one year, that I think one year 
gives us the time to have the hearing and the debate that we may need in this 
matter. 
President: Alright, a substitute motion is before us. Delay it one year. Senator 
? .... rather interesting commitment here. You remember that originally we had a 
bill that was touted in the press as the ski bill. And on that bill we had some 
qualifications for keeping that money, if I could just remind you the money had to 
be spent, it could only be used in three areas, new lifts, snow making machinery, 
or new grooming equipment. So number one when we removed that originally it 
had to be, then fourth it would have had to be match three to one by the resorts, so 
for the resorts to keep any part of that sales tax off of that they then had to match 
it three to one, so they had to put that money in. We're going to have a caucus I 
think Thursday people from the ski industry here to talk about that very issue. I 
would be more inclined if we have those kinds of provisions instead of just giving 
it as an out right credit. In this where we're trying to raise taxes and reduce it. I 
can justify it and I've seen the numbers it's astounding, and I think Thursday 
there's going to be a lot of eyes really opened here when they realize the amount 
of money that we made this year. That we would not have made had we not 
passed that incentive. It's a very wise thing but doing it here I'm not sure is the 
wisest thing to do. I hope that's not impugning you, I just would rather see some 
of those qualifications put back in to if we were going to pass it whether it's for a 
year or to 2003,1 could easily do it even to 2003 if we put some of those matched 
dollars and in all honesty they should be to hard to meet, because many of these 
ski resorts in the state will be using it to enhance those programs. 
President: [inaudible] 
? Let me respond just a little bit. This bill has come up a year early. It's scheduled 
next year to go through the tax revisions commission and to have hearings. I 
don't think it is the best thing, I won't talk about wise or not, but I don't think it's 
the best thing to do to have this here now before we have those hearing and have 
folks have a chance to talk about these kinds of issues and one thing I think I'm 
doing is pointing out that there are some issues in there with notifying what the 
Tax Commission has said that anything with an S you tax and the other's you 
don't and I hate to codify that at this point in time. As far as the rest of it goes, 
you can just decide, we're one of two states now and you know maybe there's 
some reason those other states don't tax this and I don't make the argument on the 
Olympics so much it's just we're jumping this ahead a year and we're doing 
something that forty, forty-eight other states don't do and we haven't had the 
chance for the thing to go through that process next year of the tax revision 
commission, so for those reasons, I'd ask for your support of the amendment. 
President: Alright, the substitute amendment's before us. I'll place the question, and asked to 
repeat your amendment Senator Blackham. 
Blackham: ....substitute motion, the substitute motion was that we simply amend it for one 
year, not, amend the sales tax on the ski, ski what?, ski lifts for one year. 
President: Alright, those in favor say Aye, oh wait a minute, Senator Haven wants to talk? 
Haven: ah yes 
President: Well get up earlier then. 
Haven: What we're trying to do is get everybody on a fair playing field. Now if they 
want to have this exempt, then let them come in separately on it. Make the 
argument. What we're trying to do is make this fair for everybody. And let they 
come in afterwards and go ahead. We're now .... the tax, why should we give 
them the break even for a year until we hear their merits. You know sometimes 
we do funny things in this chamber, but we have before us now not a tax 
reduction program, we have a state fairness program. And I don't think this 
should be changed at all. I think we should just leave it and this bill passes we're 
treating everybody the same. It's not fair to start bring on these other people and 
at the same time in one wack reduce our total revenue by about half. And I urge 
you to vote against the substitute and also the main motion. 
President: The substitute motion, those in favor say Aye, Opposed by no. Substitute motion 
fails, we're back to the main motion. Further discussion on the main motion? I'll 
pose it. Those in favor say Aye, those opposed by no. Motion fails. Now we're 
back to the bill. Senator Barlow. Oh Senator Black if you'd like. 
Black: If we're making this even on everybody, I see a big inequity in this thing, you're 
raising on all types of activities in this bill on page 8, on the front you're charging 
someone that might go down and buy a season pass, or tickets to the Jazz game or 
something like that, you're gonna charge them a tax, but if I belong to Elks or the 
Moose or any other fraternal organization that has that including country clubs, 
then we're exempt from the tax. I don't think that's a level playing field, Senator 
Barlow. If you're gonna make it level, then we should amend that other part out 
and tax [inaudible] 
? Yes, I would like to answer that, we'll have another bill coming along Senator 
Black which will have a chance to examine the sales tax exemption that we now 
give to religious groups and to charitable groups. You're talking about a 
charitable group, at that time I think you can address that issue but not in this bill. 
This is not the bill to do. 
President: Senator McCallister 
McCallister: Senator Barlow, on page 8 you made an amendment very early that really slipped 
by me, I'm against. On line 16, they have video games, and on line 18 they have 
games, now what's the difference and which one did you amend out? 
Barlow: Well, in the committee they took out the video games and the pinball machines 
and we should have also added at that time games, 'cause we addressed that on 
the previous bill when we were addressing video games. 
McCallister: So now the bill has been amended so that none of them are included, video games, 
pinball machines and games? 
Barlow: Right, because this is strictly an admissions issue, strictly an admission and the 
other bill that we addressed and discussed and passed by just one vote margin we 
addressed those other areas. 
McCallister: What is the difference between, what do you include in the definition of games? 
Barlow: Well, you could lift, the fact that we took out the video games and pinball 
machines it left it very unclear as to exactly what they meant, so the best thing to 
do would be to take it out, then if you want to insert it back into the bill that we 
passed, but that's the place to do it. 
McCallister: Well, often we on line 18 would say sports activities would be games, a baseball 
game, 
Barlow: That's already included in 
McCallister: When you delete games though, games would not be defined as athletic type of 
events 
Barlow: Athletic events are already covered, line 12 
ag464/cls/sbl91.trn 
AFFIDAVIT OF SARA JENSON 
) 
)ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Sara Jenson, a legal secretary for the Utah Attorney General's Office, hereby certify 
that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of a cassette tape recording of the debate in the 
Senate on Senate Bill 191. 
'
/
^Mi \f\ ^?i.-J 
Sara Jenson 
VERIFICATION 
) 
)ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On ,J-V" day of / 
.~X<{ j r> jf\ ¥?{ I ) , who duly acknowledged under oath that she is the signer 
LLZLL _, 1997, appeared before me 
of the foregoing Affidavit and that the information set forth therein is true and correct to the best 
of her knowledge. 
^.Notary Public T 
DIANE SANDBERG | 
, , , , ^
 f 60 South Main #900 ! > \ 
) :3 ^LakeCity,. Utah 64144 J % A /. , ' 
7 My Commission Expires I ( / \'1' f l 
JsffiW 1u4h93 • NOTARY PUBLIC 
ti^C 
NOTARY PUBLIC i( 
Residing at: ^ / f . f f l/jj/f ( %yj j / f c t [ 
Senate Bill 191 in the House 
? .... back on the House calendar and maybe I could just tell what the plan is today. 
So that people aren't worried about the House Bills that are out there still, we 
need to get the Senate Bills resolved one way or the other, then we intend to come 
back to the House calendar and then we intend staying on the floor tonight until 
5:30 instead of 4:00, we've notified the public that executive appropriations won't 
start until 6 instead of 4:00. And so we'll be back to the House calendar and 
hopefully get through the bills that are on the board that you're concerned about, 
we'd ask you to support the motion to go to the Senate calendar. 
Speaker: Motion is to go to the Senate calendar, all those in favor say Aye, those opposed 
say no. Motion carries we're on the Senate calendar. Madam reading clerk. 
Clerk: Senate Bill No. 191 - Sales tax treatment of admission and user fees by Haven J. 
Barlow, et al. 
Speaker: Representative Valentine. 
Valentine: Thank you Mr. Speaker. This is the first of the four sales tax exemptions coming 
over from the Senate. This is dealing with the admissions to certain types of 
entertainment. Presently we tax admissions to some entertainments, and don't tax 
admissions to other types of entertainment. The type of entertainment we do tax 
starts with an S. Skiing for example. The type of entertainment we do not tax 
start with something other than an S. G for example, Golf. Those sales tax 
exemptions are so difficult to try and determine what is and is not sales taxable, 
that Senator Barlow decided to go ahead and run this bill this year, to try to see if 
we could make some sense out of this area. Admissions should be a taxable 
event, if it is taxable at all it should be taxable across the board. I encourage your 
support on it, I'm open to debate on this bill Mr. Speaker. 
Speaker: Thank you Representative Valentine. Representative Atkinson. 
Atkinson: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Fellow Representatives, this is speech B that I gave the 
other day. I think I don't need to say anything more than that, except to say that 
I'm a golfer, this is going to tax golfing, but I think it's needed in order to do it 
and I'm willing to pay that price in order to remove all sales tax exemptions in 
this state. And next year, when we start to move major industries and their sales 
tax exemptions you'll be hearing speech B again if I'm fortunate enough to be 
here. Thank you Mr. Speaker. 
Speaker: Thank you Representative Atkinson. When we get to removing all of them, that 
will be interesting. Representative Valentine, there seems to be no further lights. 
Summation. 
Valentine: Waive summation 
Speaker: Summation is waived, voting is open. Voting hopefully will soon be open on 
Senate Bill 191. 
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